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The words "group defamation" in the title are apt to be mis-
leading in any treatment of civil liability for libel. Such liability
will ultimately lie only where the group is an integrated organism
recognized or recognizable as a unit having legal power to sue, or
in the case of an individual member of the group where the indi-
vidual has been damaged and can show that the libel was directed
either against him as an individual, or apparently directed against
a group but in reality striking him as an individual, so as to in-
dicate a reckless disregard for his rights.
Such difficulty as arises in analyzing precedent and in the ap-
plication of the law arises from the commingling of opinion in the
civil and criminal branches. In the criminal branch of the law
there is a long history of the use of group libel as a repressive po-
litical force.' This has, however, led to opinions in civil cases
which have discussed group libel as having a potency beyond the
proper growth of civil liability.
In early Roman law, and probably in periods before that, those
in possession of the machinery of the state utilized that machinery
to maintain themselves in power. They were sensitive to criticism
and they therefore censored the dissident. The very name which they
gave to their laws for the protection of the emperor and others
against libel, i.e., Libelli Famosi, (Ulp., D. 47. 10.5.9) gives the story
away. These laws, of course, were enacted by the groups in power
and the libel was always of those who occupied great position.
Likewise the first English law on the subject was entitled De
Scandalis Magnatum (1275). This statute, following the pattern
of Roman law, sought to protect the then rulers of England against
the revolt of a rising peasantry. Down through the days of the
Stuart despotism and the Star Chamber we find a similar pattern,
so that the Star Chamber could say:
Let all men take heede how they complayne against
any magistrate for they are Gods.
This pattern in which libels of the groups were libels of upper
classes was to continue in England until the Nineteenth Century.
The general notion was expressed by Coke that:
the blame of public men being a more serious matter than
the blame of a private man.
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The notion that the king could do no wrong lay at the basis of pro-
tecting not only the king but his judges and counsellors as groups,
and the laws were well entitled against "seditious libel."
But the Reformation intervened. Feudal status was giving way
to financial and commercial position. The individual was emerging
as a potent social force and the power of the united clergy and
peerage was waning. Libel which had theretofore been concerned
with those who had status became more and more concerned
with those who had wealth. The reparation which the laws of
libel now offered was not so much to honor as it was to ability
to earn and to have and to hold property. This development shows
itself clearly in the early history of libel in the United States
and in the differences that existed in the laws of the United
States and of England. In England, still honoring doctrines of libel
affecting the great and upper classes, truth was not a defense, for
to say of a naked king that he was naked was just as offensive
as to say of a well clothed king that he was naked. It was not
until 1710 that the last case was brought under a successor to the
statute De Scandalis Magnatum, and it was not until late in the
Eighteen Hundreds, after a series of intervening statutes, that
truth was finally established as a defense. This fight for the truth
as a defense was intimately concerned with and is a part of the
history of group libel, for it was in connection with seditious libel
of the Roman groups that the doctrine of the truth as no defense
gained strength. (De Libellis Famosi, 5 Rep. 125a)
Following a false start2 based on English precedent, the United
States more rapidly developed the doctrine under which the in-
dividual might recover when he proved that it was he who was
aimed at and hit though a group was named.3 In America with its
2 Sumner v. Buell, 12 Johns (N.Y.) 475 (1815).
3 Individual cause of action lay: Gidney v. Blake, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 54
(1814); Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 185 (1840); Bornmann v. Star
Co., 174 N.Y. 212, 66 N.E. 723 (1903); Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Assn.,
184 N.Y. 479, 77 N.E. 660 (1906); Gross v. Cantor, 270 N.Y. 93, 200 N.E. 592
(1936); Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d
919 (1942); Hauptner v. White, 81 App. Div. 153, 80 N.Y. Supp. 895 (1903);
DeHoyos v. Thornton, 259 App. Div. 1, 18 N.Y. S. 2d 121 (1940); Marr v. Put-
nam, 196 Or. 1, 246 P. 2d 509 (1952); Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 123 La.
594, 49 So. 206 (1909); Ellis v. Kimball, 16 Pick (Mass.) 132 (1834); Byers v.
Martin, 2 Colo. 605 (1875); International Textbook Co. v. Leader Publishing
Co., 189 Fed. 86 (N.D. Ohio 1910).
No individual cause of action lay: Sumner v. Buell, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 475
(1815); Hays v. American Defense Society, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929);
Feely v. Vitagraph Co., 184 App. Div. 527, 172 N.Y. Supp. 264 (1918); Oma
v. Hillman Periodicals, 281 App. Div. 240 (1953); Lynch v. Kirby, 74 Misc.
266, 131 N.Y. Supp. 680 (1911); Matter of Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp.
407 (1936); Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N.E. 2d
553 (1947); Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 143 Mich. 430, 107 N.W. 81 (1906);
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concepts of free speech and of the rights of the individual we have
never recognized the ancient doctrine of class libel which would
protect any group in the practice of political, religious or other
discrimination. There have been attempts to utilize the libel laws
for those purposes, but such attempts have been confined to the
criminal branch.
After the first attempt to find our legal feet in this field it
was evident that group libel would be the basis of civil liability
when the group could be segregated so that it had a unity which
amounted to a substitute for personality. The ancient concepts of a
ruling class which needed protection and for whose benefit group
libel laws were passed was fading. The ecclesiastical hierarchy and
the political peerage were disappearing. With the rise of the Prot-
estant religion, the individual and the groups which he formed
for his financial and social betterment, were coming to the fore.
The industrial revolution was creating new legal organiza-
tions. Private corporations were gaining recognition. Our society
was faced with the problem of how far group libel could survive
and along what lines the development of the law would go. In a
democracy it was necessary to strike a balance between individual
protection and social need. Where free speech is important the in-
dividual must sometimes give way and allow criticism, even to
the point of defamation. This is apparent from our doctrines of
libel in the political field. Henceforth general social considerations
rather than a regard for a specific power would determine the
membership of which groups would be legally protected and new
definitions would have to be found and applied. In part they went
this way.
There are amorphorous groups indicating large divisions among
mankind which are not recognizable as groups having integrated
form which society will recognize as a proper party plaintiff. So we
find the world divided on the basis of color into white, black,
yellow, red, brown and tan, and a combination of these colors. It
is obvious that there are people of these colors scattered all over
the face of the world, and remarks addressed about them would
not indicate any integrated group. So again we find Moslems,
Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 277 N.W. 177 (1938); Comes v. Cruce,
85 Ark. 79, 107 S.W. 185 (1908); Noral v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 40 Cal.
App. 2d 348 (1940); Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S.W. 2d 41
(1934); Arnold v. Ingram, 151 Wis. 438, 138 N.W. 111 (1912); Helmicks v.
Stevlingson, 212 Wis. 614, 250 N.W. 402 (1933); American Civil Liberties Union
v. Kiely, 40 F. 2d 451 (2d Cir. 1930); Service Parking Corporation v. Wash-
ington Times Co., 92 F. 2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
182 F. 2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Brewer v. Hearst Pub. Co., 185 F. 2d 846 (7th
Cir. 1950); Watts-Wagner Co. v. General Motors Corporation, 64 F. Supp. 506
(S.D. N.Y. 1945); Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 107 F. Supp. 96 (SMD. N.Y. 1952).
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Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Jews, Zorastrians and
members of other religions, distributed over the face of the earth,
though some of them find greater aggregation in particular regions.
These groups are too large, too diffuse, to be recognizable as the
type of collective organism any one of whose members might sue
for a libel directed against the group. Even in politics we find com-
mon designations making strange bedfellows, for Republicans and
Democrats, the major political parties in the United States, find
their names duplicated in other countries whose forms of govern-
ment are not even republican or democratic but who loudly proclaim
their adherence to republican and democratic tradition. The use
of the words "Republican" and "Democratic" do not generally des-
ignate any group of persons having status as such. It is only in par-
ticular instances where they can be segregated as corporate or
legally recognizable groups that they attain legal status.
From the great groups we come to secondary groups of trades
or professions. So the words "lawyers," "doctors," "dentists," "per-
formers" or "taxi-drivers," are words indicating all those who
follow a specific trade or profession, and in the absence of con-
finement and localization indicate groups too undifferentiated to
have legal status.
A reference to any of these large undifferentiated groups may
actually be aimed at a limited portion of the totality, thus describ-
ing an integrated recognizable body. So Moslem may denote a
general religion. It does not prevent a specific group of Moslems
organized into a specific church in a specific community and having
a well defined membership from acquiring legal status. Republican,
Democratic or other appellation indicating political adherence to
a specific idea or "ism" may be vagne or indefinite, but "Demo-
cratic Benevolent Association of the Seventeenth Ward" in a named
city may be a group specific enough to warrant inclusion amongst
possible plaintiffs. With regard to description in terms of color one
can imagine a community in which white men are in the minority.
One can also conjure up an association of those men, consisting of
a number so small, that they could be recognizable as a separate
group. So each of the largest possible groupings not as such recog-
nizable as a possible party plaintiff might in splinter form be a
body discernible by the law as having those attributes which could
suffer harm by invidious description or harmful word.
Our own times, colored as they have been by great wars and
cold wars, have yielded many examples of group libel or attack.
So we have seen the entire Protestant clergy of America attacked
by quasi governmental officials. We have seen Bar Associations
labelled as subversive. We have seen all manner of organizations,
including professorial organizations, labelled as "Red" - a term
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held libelous. We have seen in at least one instance involving a
great public scandal a young lawyer held up to scorn and ridicule
by reason of his having been a member of a Bar Association which
had been described as subversive. It is obivious that group libel is at
this time reaching a great flowering, more putrescent perhaps than
beautiful.
There are lesser aggregations which have been recognized as
having the ability to sue as a group in civil libel. Amongst them
have been corporations, 4 partnerships,5 unincorporated associations 6
such as trade unions and charitable organizations. The test in each
case has been whether the group can be recognized to have a form
that is not amorphous. Whether it has such a stake in society that
an attack upon its reputation will lessen its efforts towards the pur-
poses for which it was created was the rationale behind allowing
charitable organizations, which theoretically have no commercial
end, to sue. In the case of trade unions, though they were organized
purely for the benefit of their individual members, the union was
recognized as having sufficient identity so that it could sue when
its reputation was attacked to the point where it would lessen its
capability for use within the sphere of its own function.7
The division therefore consists of large indivisible precisely
undefinable groups which may break down into smaller fractions
of the whole which are recognizable and definable and which have
legal capacity to sue. Still we have not reached the individual,
for the libel which is ostensibly of a group, must in reality be a
libel by reference or imputation to an individual if there is to be
an individual cause of action. In a proper sense there is no libel of
the group. There is libel of individuals referred to by a group term
which when pierced discloses the individuals. So in each of these
instances above the individual members or officers did not by rea-
son of the group attain the stature of a party plaintiff as an indi-
vidual because of the damage done the group. It was the group
4 Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union 2928, United States
Steelworkers of America, 152 F. 2d 493 (7th Cir. 1945); Reporters Association of
America v. Sun Printing & Publishing Association, 186 N.Y. 437, 79 N.E. 710
(1906); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Mitchell, 10 F. Supp. 91 (EJD. Va. 1935).
S Taylor v. Church, 8 N.Y. 452 (1853); Funk v. Even. Post Pub. Co., 152
N.Y. 619, 46 N.E. 292 (1897); Collier v. Postum Cereal Co., 150 App. Div. 169,
134 N.Y. Supp. 847 (1912).6 Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d 919
(1942); New York Society for Suppression of Vice v. Macfadden Publications,
Inc., 260 N.Y. 167,183 N.E. 284 (1932); Finnish Temperance Society v. Socialistic
Publishing Co., 238 lass. 345, 130 N.E. 845 (1921); Bradley v. Conners, 169
Misc. 442, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 294 (1938); Lubliner v. Reinlib, 184 Misc. 472, 50 N.Y.S.
2d 786 (1944).
7Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d 919
(1942).
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considered as an entity, having a legally recognizable form, to
which the right to sue was extended. So in the case of the union,
the individual officers were not allowed a cause of action.8 In the
case of a partnership, the individual partners were not allowed a
cause of action.9 In the case of a corporation, the officers and di-
rectors would not as such have a cause of action for themselves.
For the individual to have a cause of action he must be able
to demonstrate that the libel was uttered of and concerning him
even though disguised by the use of a group label or one which
would seem to be levelled at the anonymous members of a group.
The anonymity is shattered when the individual can point to in-
dividual recognition. In a town in which there was only one Mo-
hammedan lawyer or doctor a statement that a Mohammedan
doctor or lawyer was guilty of malpractice, while obviously a
combination of two large group terms, would nevertheless be un-
derstood by those to whom the words were directed to indicate
a single individual.10 If in the course of describing a labor scandal
one were to say that the officers of a local union then engaged in
a strike were well known to have been corrupt and to have stolen
the funds of the union, if such statement was made without ex-
ception so as to indicate the specific officers of a specific local, each
of them would have an action for libel. If one were to say of a
Board of Aldermen that the members of the Board had conspired
against the welfare of their city by awarding corrupt contracts
each member of the Board would have a cause of action."1 It does
not matter how large the number, or how great the territory cov-
ered by the word used, if in the specific instance it can be pointed
out that the large word refers to a person. But where the word is
so used that it may be used innocently, as well as in a guilty con-
nection, then there can be no recovery. So to say, that some of the
officers, or some of the Aldermen, are guilty of corruption would
not give a cause of action to any.'2 The words used must be words
of positive identification not of doubtful or various meaning. If
there is any question as to whether or not the plaintiff was the
person intended then as a matter of law it cannot be said that such
8 Lynch v. Kirby, 74 Misc. 266, 131 N.Y. Supp. 680 (1911); Noral v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348 (1940).
9 Constitution Pub. Co. v. Way, 94 Ga. 120, 21 S.E 139 (1893); Willis v.
Jones, 13 App. Cas. (D.C.) 482 (1898).
10 See Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 193, 200 (1840).
11 See Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d
919 (1942).
12 Giraud v. Beach, 3 F, D. Smith (N.Y.) 337 (1854); Hauptner v. White,
81 App. Div. 153, 80 N.Y. Supp. 895 (1903).
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person has a cause of action, although in cases having a reasonable
doubt the court will allow a jury to treat the matter as one of
mixed law and fact and to determine whether in law and in fact
a specific person was the person intended and damaged. 13
CONCLUSION
1. An individual cannot recover in a civil action for a group
libel.
2. An individual can recover where a libel seemingly directed
at a group is actually directed at the individual.
3. Certain words indicating race, religion, nationality, color,
are so vague and indefinite as to describe a group not legally rec-
ognizable as a legal entity.
4. No matter how large the term of description it may never-
theless be narrowed to indicate a specific person.
5. Where a group no matter how large has attained legally
recognizable form, as in the case of corporations, associations, and
partnerships, they have sufficient legal form to be recognizable as
a legal party.
6. A libel directed against such a group does not afford action
to the officers or members of such a group.
7. But such officers or members can sue individually when
the libel is directed against them as a group so as to identify them.
8. Where a legally definable group is named but the statement
is made with regard to only some of them and in such terms that
those constituting the "some" cannot be ascertained, then none of
the individuals has a right to sue.
9. Where some of a group are named under such circumstances
as to cast doubt as to whether or not a specific individual was in-
tended a question of mixed fact and law may arise which is prop-
erly left to the determination of a jury.
10. In every case where an individual sues for a group libel
the burden is on him to show that the libel was uttered with regard
to him and prove that it was a libel of and concerning him as plain-
tiff.
11. The use of a group term to libel an individual will not serve
as a screen.
13 International Textbook Co. v. Leader Publishing Co., 189 Fed. 86 (N.D.
Ohio 1910).
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